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Abstract
Vast amounts of information of all types are collected daily about people by governments, corpora-
tions and individuals. The information is collected, for example, when users register to or use on-line
applications, receive health related services, use their mobile phones, utilize search engines, or perform
common daily activities. As a result, there is an enormous quantity of privately-owned records that
describe individuals’ finances, interests, activities, and demographics. These records often include sen-
sitive data and may violate the privacy of the users if published. The common approach to safeguarding
user information, or data in general, is to limit access to the storage (usually a database) by using and
authentication and authorization protocol. This way, only users with legitimate permissions can access
the user data. However in many cases the publication of user data for statistical analysis and research can
be extremely beneficial for both academic and commercial uses, such as statistical research and recom-
mendation systems. To maintain user privacy when such a publication occurs many databases employ
anonymization techniques, either on the query results or the data itself (Adam and Worthmann [1]). In
this paper we examine variants of 2 such techniques, “data perturbation” and “query-set-size control”,
and discuss their vulnerabilities. The data perturbation method deals with changing the values of records
in the dataset while maintaining a level of accuracy over the resulting queries. We focus on a relatively
new data perturbation method called NeNDS [2] and show a possible partial knowledge privacy attack
on this method. The query-set-size control allows publication of a query result dependent on having a
minimum set size, k, of records satisfying the query parameters. We show some query types relying
on this method may still be used to extract hidden information, and prove others maintain privacy even
when using multiple queries.
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1 Introduction
In today’s world many organizations and individuals constantly gather information about people, whether
directly or indirectly. This leads to enormous databases storing private information regarding individuals’
personal and professional life. Commonly, access to these records is limited and safeguarded using au-
thorization and authentication protocols. Only authorized users may query the system for data. There are
however instances in today’s global network of organizational connections, the growing demand to dissem-
inate and share this information is motivated by various academic, commercial and other benefits. This
information is becoming a very important resource for many systems and corporations that may analyze the
data in order to enhance and improve their services and performance. The problem of privacy-preserving
data analysis has a long history spanning multiple disciplines. As electronic data about individuals becomes
increasingly detailed, and as technology enables ever more powerful collection and curation of these data,
the need increases for a robust, meaningful, and mathematically rigorous definition of privacy, together with
a computationally rich class of algorithms that satisfy this definition. A comparative analysis and discussion
of such algorithms with regards to statistical databases can be found in [1]. One common practice for pub-
lishing such data without violating privacy is applying regulations, policies and guiding principles for the
use of the data. Such regulations usually entail data distortion for the sake of anonymizing the data. In recent
years, there has been a growing use of anonymization algorithms based on differential privacy introduced
by Dwork et al. [3]. Differential privacy is a mathematical definition of how to measure the privacy risk of
an individual when they participate in a database. To construct a data collection or data querying algorithm
which constitutes differential privacy, one must add some level of noise to the collected or returned data
respectively. While ensuring some level of privacy, these methods still have several issues with regards to
implementation and data usability. Sarwate and Chaudhuri [4] discuss the challenges of differential privacy
with regards to continuous data, as well as the trade-off between privacy and utility. In some cases, the data
may become unusable after distortion. Lee and Clifton [5] discuss the difficulty of correctly implementing
differential privacy with regards to the choice of  as the differential privacy factor. Due to these issues
and restrictions, other privacy preserving algorithms are still in prevalent in many databases and statistical
data querying systems. In this paper, we address vulnerabilities of several implementations of such privacy
preserving algorithms.
The vulnerability of databases, and hence the potential avenues of attack, depend among other things on the
underlying data structure (and query behavior). The information stored in databases also comes in many
forms, such as plain text, spatial coordinates, numeric values, and others. Each combination of structure and
data format allows for its own specific attack and requires its own unique handling of privacy protection.
Another factor when handling privacy in databases is the type of queries allowed (which may be dictated
by the previously mentioned structure and data format). For example, datasets with timestamp values may
only allow min/max and grouping queries, while those containing sequential numeric values may also allow
queries regarding averages, sums, and other mathematical formulas. In Section 2 we analyze the effec-
tiveness of different queries using the k-query-set-size limitation over aggregate functions in maintaining
individual user privacy in a vehicular network.
Another field where privacy concerns are a growing issue is the field of recommendation systems. Many of
these systems use the collaborative filtering technique, in which users are required to reveal their preferences
in order to benefit from the recommendations. Su et al. [6] survey these techniques in depth. Several meth-
ods aimed at hiding and anonymizing user data have been proposed and studied in an attempt to reduce the
privacy issues of collaborative filtering. These methods include data obfuscation, random perturbation, data
suppression and others [2, 7, 8, 9]. Most of these methods rely on experimental results alone to show effec-
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tiveness, and some have already been shown to have weaknesses that can be exploited in order to recover the
original user data [10, 11]. Parameswaran and Blough [2] propose a new data obfuscation technique dubbed
“Nearest Neighbor Data Substitution” (NeNDS). In Section 3 we detail a privacy attack on NeNDS based
on partial prior information, as well as address shortcomings in the NeNDS algorithm and propose avenues
of research for its improvement. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
2 Combining Queries with k-Limited Results
The underlying data structure of a database is one of the factors in determining the querying methods used
over the database. The database logic itself may further restrict queries, in some cases allowing for query-
ing a specific key and in others only returning aggregate results over a set of values. The data type stored
may also be a factor when discerning which querying methods may be used. Numeric values can allow
for mathematical queries such as sums, averages and medians. Text fields may allow for string operations
such as “contains”, “starts-with”, or even regular expressions. In the same manner, these queries may also
be prohibited as they may convey information that is meant to remain private. Other limitations may be
placed on queries as well, such as the query-set-size limitation, blocking query results in cases where a
predefined number (k) of record look-ups have not been reached (i.e. the number of users/items taken into
consideration by the query are less than k). Venkatadri et al. [12] recently demonstrated a Privacy attack
on Facebook users by utilizing an exploit in Facebook’s targeted advertising API which similarly restricted
query results containing too few users. Using a combination of multiple queries which returned aggregate
results (or no results due to a low number of users matching the query), the researchers were able to narrow
down personally identifiable information which was regarded as private by the users. In this section we look
at such cases and attempt to determine whether an attacker can use a combination of allowed queries in
order to extract information which the prohibited queries mean to block. This may be done using multiple
queries of the same type, or a combination of several query types.
2.1 Dataset and Query Models
We attempt to show privacy attacks on data gathered from vehicular networks. The gathered data is stored
in a centralized database which allows a set of queries that are designed to return meaningful information
without compromising that privacy of the users. A privacy attack is defined as access to any information
gathered from the user that was not made available from standard queries on the database.
2.1.1 Graph Datasets Model
A vehicular network is comprised of n unique units distributed in the real world and are displayed on a
graph G as a set of vertices V such that each vertex vi, i = (1, 2, 3, . . . , n) represents one vehicle at a single
(discrete) point in time tj . The timestamps are measured as incremental time steps from the system’s initial
measurement designated t0 = 0. We consider three different graph models:
• A linear graphGL with vehicles distributed along discrete coordinates on theX axis between−∞,∞.
• A two-dimensional planar graph GP with vehicles distributed along discrete coordinates on the X
and Y axis between −∞,∞.
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• A three-dimensional cubic graph GC with vehicles distributed along discrete coordinates on the X ,
Y and Z axis between −∞,∞.
For each vehicle vi at each timestamp, the speed is measured. We denote this Si,t with t being a discrete
value timestamp.
2.1.2 Query Model
Following are the set of queries allowed over the database.
• Favg = f(R, τ) → Savg: given a range R a timestamp τ , return the average speed Savg over all
vehicles in the given range at the given time.
• Fmax = f(R, τ)→ Smax given a range R a timestamp τ , return the max speed Savg over all vehicles
in the given range at the given time.
• Fmin = f(R, τ)→ Smin given a range R a timestamp τ , return the min speed Smin over all vehicles
in the given range at the given time.
• Fmed = f(R, τ) → Smed given a range R a timestamp τ , return the median speed Smed over all
vehicles in the given range at the given time.
The range R is defined by a set of boundaries over the relevant graph:
• RL in GL: A starting coordinate xstart and end coordinate xend.
• RP in GP : A rectangle with corners (x1, y1), (x2, y2).
• RC in GC : A box with corners (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2).
In order to protect user privacy, all queries deal with measurements over aggregated data so as not to
indicate a single user’s information. As such, the queries only return a result if at least k unique values have
been recorded for the scope over which the query has been run, where k < n. The value k is known to
the attacker, however the number of records which were a part of each query result is not (i.e. the attacker
only knows that if a result returned there are at least k records in the requested scope R, τ , but not the exact
number).
2.2 Analysis of Favg
In this section we present privacy attack problems over different graphs and queries.
2.2.1 Linear vehicular placement
Model: A linear graph GL with n vehicles.
Queries: Favg.
Attack: find the speed of a single vehicle vtarget at a given time τ .
It is easy to see that a single query will not constitute an attack. The attack can be performed using the
following algorithm:
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• Select a range RL1 with xstart1 = xvtarget , xend1 =∞.
• Run query F (RL1 , τ) and denote the result Savg1.
• Select a new range R2 with xstart2 = xvtarget + 1, xend2 =∞.
• Run query F (RL2 , τ) and denote the result Savg2.
• Continue querying over ranges, each time incrementing xstarti , 1 < i < n until a result isn’t returned.
Mark the last coordinate which returned a result as xend and the result returned as Savg(k). Note that
there were k records in this scope.
• You can now backtrack over all results and calculate the speed of each vehicle between xs1 and xend.
Denote this algorithm ALGSL . We can see that the runtime for this algorithm is the number of query
iterations required to find a section with k − 1 vehicles.
2.2.2 2D vehicular placement
Model: A two-dimensional planar graph GP with n vehicles distributed along discrete coordinates on the
X and Y axis between −∞,∞.
Queries: Favg.
Attack(1): find the speed of a single vehicle vtarget at a given time τ .
Attack(2): find the average speed of a set U of vehicles, with the size of U smaller than k, |U | < k at a
given time τ .
Assumptions: The values of n and k are known, where n >> k. We first select some value y on the Y axis,
denote this value Ymid, and split GP into 3 ranges (the section above Ymid, the section below Ymid, and the
section containing only Ymid):
• RPtop: (−∞, Ymid), (∞,∞).
• RPbot: (−∞, Ymid), (∞,−∞).
• RPmid: (−∞, Ymid), (∞, Ymid).
Note that both RPtop and R
P
bot contain R
P
mid, and the union of R
P
top and R
P
bot is the entire graph containing all
vehicles (RPn = R
P
GP
= RPtop∪RPbot). We define RˆPtop RˆPbot to be RPtop∩RPmid and RPbot∩RPmid respectively.
See partition example in Figure 1. It is important to note that due to symmetry, this partition can also be
done around some value x on the X axis, with the sections built around this value Xmid.
We now perform 5 Favg queries on GP :
Stop = Favg(R
P
top, τ), Sbot = Favg(R
P
bot, τ), Sˆtop = Favg(Rˆ
P
top, τ), Sˆbot = Favg(Rˆ
P
bot, τ), Sn = Favg(R
P
n , τ).
If one of the selected queries does not return a response (i.e. it contains less than k vehicles), we re-select
Ymid and repeat the process until all 5 queries are answered (such a value Ymid should exists due to the size
of n and the probable distribution of vehicles).
Using the results Stop, Sbot, Sˆtop, Sˆbot, Sn we wish to find the average speed of vehicles in section
Smid = Favg(R
P
mid, T ), and the number of vehicles in each section: R
P
top, R
P
bot, Rˆ
P
top, Rˆ
P
bot, R
P
mid. The
number of vehicles in each section is a function of the section range and a given timestamp: C(R, τ). We
denote the number of vehicles in each section as follows:
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Figure 1: Vehicular network GP range partition around Ymid = 20
1. T = C(RPtop, τ).
2. B = C(RPbot, τ).
3. M = C(RPmid, τ).
4. Tˆ = C(RˆPtop, τ) = T −M .
5. Bˆ = C(RˆPbot, τ) = B −M .
To do so, we solve the following equation system:
• n · Sn = B · Sbot + T · Stop −M · Smid.
• B + T −M = n.
• T · Stop = Tˆ · Sˆtop +M · Smid = (T −M) · Sˆtop +M · Smid.
• B · Sbot = Bˆ · Sˆbot +M · Smid = (B −M) ·B · Sˆbot +M · Smid.
Solving this system gives us the following:
• B = n·(Sn−Sˆtop)
Sbot−Sˆtop .
• T = n·(Sn−Sˆbot)
Stop−Sˆbot .
• M = n·[Sn·(Sˆtop+Sˆbot−Sbot−Stop)+Sbot·Stop−Sˆbot·Sˆtop]
(Sˆbot−Stop)·Sbot+(Stop−Sˆbot)·Sˆbot .
• Smid = (Sˆbot·Sˆtop−Sbot·Stop)·SnSbot·Stop+(Sˆtop+Sˆbot−Stop−Sbot)·Sn−Sˆbot·Sˆtop +
(Stop−Sˆtop)·Sbot·Sˆbot+(Sbot−Sˆbot)·Stop·Sˆtop)
Sbot·Stop+(Sˆtop+Sˆbot−Stop−Sbot)·Sn−Sˆbot·Sˆtop .
Denote this process ALGSP . The runtime for this algorithm is the equivalent to running 5 queries on the
dataset, with the addition of solving above equation system.
With these values we can now attempt Attack(1) and Attack(2): If M < k, we have succeeded in
Attack(2). If M > k, we can run ALGSL on R
P
mid which represents the boundaries of a linear graph,
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we can select on any vehicle with k vehicles on either side of it as the target vehicle vtarget and perform
Attack(1). If M = k, we cannot complete either attack, so we select a new value Ymid and run ALGSP
again. There exists an edge case of graphs where for all values of y that we can choose as Ymid, the number
of vehicles M will be equal to k, in which case we will be unable to perform any attack. This scenario is,
however, unlikely in the case of vehicular networks. In addition, since we have the number of vehicles T
and B in RPtop and R
P
bot respectively, if these values are sufficiently large in relation to n, we can look at
these ranges as sub-graphs of GP and run ALGSP on them with nT = T and nB = B.
It is easy to see that we can apply the same method used on the two dimensional graph GP on the three
dimensional graph GC with some minor modifications as follows. We again select some value y on the Y
axis, denote this value Ymid, and splitGC into 3 ranges (the section above Ymid, the section below Ymid, and
the section containing only Ymid). In this instance, these sections are represented as cubes in the following
manner:
• RCtop: (−∞, Ymid,−∞), (∞,∞,∞).
• RCbot: (−∞, Ymid,−∞), (∞,−∞,∞).
• RCmid: (−∞, Ymid,−∞), (∞, Ymid,∞).
Similarly, we define RˆCtop, Rˆ
C
bot to be R
C
top ∩ RCmid and RCbot ∩ RCmid respectively. Note that after running
our five queries on the five sections, we achieve the same linear equations as in the two dimensional case.
Solving these equations now leaves us with the average speed over the plane defined by RCmid, and the
number of vehicles M in this plane. As in the two dimensional case, if M < k we have succeeded in
Attack(2). If M > k we now have a sub-graph of GC which constitutes a two dimensional graph GP on
which we may be able to perform ALGSP . The minimum size M for this to be possible is M = 2k + 1k.
While our results, given as ALGSL , ALGSP and ALGSC , refer to the average speeds of vehicles in their
respective graph placements, they are not limited to speed values. The same methods can be used for any
numeric value that can be averaged over a set of vehicles in this manner, such as number of traffic violations
a vehicle has accumulated, number of accidents the vehicle has been involved in, and so on. Any of these,
when given as averages over a set of vehicles may appear innocent and maintain high level of privacy for
an individual in the system. However, as we have shown, an individual’s data can be inferred with minimal
effort by employing our methods. Of course, we are also not limited to vehicular networks. Any data set
with the same structure of node placement in a graph will yield the same results.
2.3 Analysis of Fmin, Fmax and Fmed
In this section we look at possible attacks using the minimum, maximum and median value queries over
ranges in the graph as defined previously by Fmin, Fmax and Fmed respectively. Similar to the case of
Favg, we define that the queries will not return a result if the target Range R at time τ contains less than k
individual values. In addition, our analysis of potential attacks rests on the following set of assumptions:
• The data set consists of n unique values.
• The value k is known to the attacker.
• In case a result is returned, the number of actual values in (R, τ) is not known to the attacker.
• If (R, τ) contains an even number of values, Fmed returns the lower of the 2 median values.
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• The attacker is limited only to the Fmin, Fmax and Fmed queries, but can perform any number of
queries over the data set.
For simplicity, we will treat the data set as in the previous section - a linear graphGL representing a snapshot
in time τ of recorded speeds of vehicles in a specified area. A query of type q (q being min,max or med)
at time τ over a range beginning at xi and ending at xj (inclusive) will be denoted Fq([xi, xj ]).
We note that there are several special cases in which a trivial attack can be performed. We will address
these cases before moving on to the general case.
2.3.1 Case 1: Global Min/Max
Since there exist a unique global minimum and global maximum in the graph, it is easy to see that by
querying over the entire graph and iteratively decreasing the range until a new minimum/maximum is found,
the vehicle with the minimum and maximum speeds can be discovered.
2.3.2 Case 2: k − localMin/Max
Similar to the case of a global min/max, if a vehicle has the local minimum or maximum value with regards
to his k nearest neighbors then their speed can be discovered. This is done using the same method as stated
for the global min/max. A range consisting of k + 1 vehicles, with the outer vehicle having a min (max)
speed in that group must be found. Once found, decrease the range until a group of size k remains in its
bounds. By our k − local definition, the min (max) value now changes, and the attacker knows that the
previous value belongs to the vehicle that has been removed from the range. Note that if a such a k − local
min/max vehicle exists in the graph, the attacker can find it given enough queries.
2.3.3 Case 3: k = 3
In this case, since all values are defined to be unique, querying Fmin, Fmax, Fmed on a range containing
exactly 3 vehicles return 3 values, each belonging to a specific vehicle. An attacker can query over a single
coordinate at the left-most side of the graph and increase the range until a result is returned. The first time a
result is returned, the minimum k = 3 group size has been reached, and the attacker has the speed of each
of the 3 vehicles. Each speed cannot be attributed to a specific vehicle, but we will denote these 3 values
s1, s2, s3. The attacker now decreases the range’s size from the left until no result is returned, this indicates
the range now only contains 2 vehicles. Increasing the range to the right until a result is returned indicates
that a new vehicle has been added to the range. Since all values are unique, one of the values s1, s2, s3
will be missing from the results. This belongs to the left-most vehicle from the previous query results.
Continuing this method until the entire graph has been scanned will reveal the speeds of each vehicle in the
graph.
2.3.4 The General Case: k ≥ 4
We show that for the general case, there exists a linear placement of vehicles such that at least 1 vehi-
cle will have a speed whose value will remain hidden from an attacker. Note that if a combination of
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Fmin, Fmax, Fmed queries can be used to attain the same results as the query Favg, then a privacy attack
can be performed in the manner detailed in Section 2.2.1. Hozo et al. [13] devise a method to estimate
the average value and variance of a group using knowledge of only the minimum, maximum and median
values. However, for the attack described in ALGSL to succeed, the actual average value is required and
not just an estimate. We use an adversarial model and show that for any number n of vehicles and any
minimal query size k, a vehicle arrangement can be created in which the attacker, using any combination of
the above mentioned queries, lacks the ability to discover the speed of at least 1 vehicle. For any value of
k ≥ 4 and n ≥ k we prove this for a specific vehicle v1 placed at the leftmost occupied coordinate on the X
axis (denoted x1). For any value of k ≥ 4 and n ≥ 2k we prove this vehicle may be at any coordinate.
Lemma 2.1. Let V be a set of n vehicles v1, v2, . . . , vn positioned along a linear graph at coordinates
x1, x2, . . . , xn at time τ . If k ≥ 4, for any value n ≥ k there exists a corresponding assignment of
speeds s1, s2, . . . , sn, such that the speed s1 of v1 cannot be determined by any attacker with access to
the Fmin, Fmax and Fmed queries over the graph.
Proof. We prove by induction for k = 4 and n ≥ k, then extrapolate for k ≥ 4 and n ≥ k.
Show Correctness for k = 4, n = 4
With vehicles v1, v2, v3, v4 positioned at x1, x2, x3, x4, set the values of s1, s2, s3, s4 such that s2 > s1 >
s3 > s4. Since k = n = 4 the queries will only return results when the range queried contains the range
[x1, xn]. It is easy to see that:
• Fmin([x1, xn]) = s4.
• Fmax([x1, xn]) = s2.
• Fmed([x1, xn]) = s3.
As such, the value s1 of v1 is never revealed.
Assume Correctness for k = 4, n = N
Given a set of vehicles v1, v2, v3, . . . , vN positioned at coordinates x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN , assume there exists
an assignment of corresponding speeds s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN such that s1 cannot be determined by an attacker
with access to any number of Fmin, Fmax, Fmed queries with a k = 4 limitation.
Prove for k = 4, n = N + 1
We assign s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN such that for the subgraph [x1, xN ], for k = 4, the value of s1 is never revealed
by any query Fmin, Fmax, Fmed. We note 2 properties regarding sN+1 of the node vN+1, placed at (xN+1 |
xN+1 > xN ):
1. There exists only 1 queryable range, [x1, xN+1], for which any query will take both s1 and sN+1 into
consideration.
2. Regardless of the value of sN+1, the queries Fmin([x1, xN+1]) and Fmax([x1, xN+1]) cannot return s1
as a result. (Otherwise, s1 would have been a result of one of the queries over the subgraph [x1, xN ])
Due to these properties, we must only ensure that the query
Fmed([x1, xN+1]) does not return s1 as it’s result. Denote smedN to be the result of Fmed([x1, xN ]). If
smedN > s1 then we set (sN+1 | sN+1 > smedN ) so that Fmed([x1, xN+1]) ≥ smedN > s1. Conversely, if
smedN < s1 then we set (sN+1 | sN+1 < smedN ) so that Fmed([x1, xN+1]) ≤ smedN < s1. We now have
an assignment s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN , sN+1 such that the value s1 cannot be discovered by an attacker.
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Extrapolate for k ≥ 4, n ≥ k
The parameter k is defined as the minimum number of vehicles required to be in a range in order for a
result to be returned. For any value of (n | n > k) increasing the value of k only reduces the number of
available queries that will return a result. Since it holds that there exists an assignment s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn
such that s1 cannot be discovered for k = 4, then setting k = 5 for the same assignment will not give any
new information to the attacker and s1 will remain unknown. It can be seen that this is true for any value k
such that n ≥ k ≥ 4.
While Lemma 2.1 holds for any value of k ≥ 4 and n ≥ k, such an assignment, where a specific node is
deterministically undiscoverable, is susceptible to prior knowledge attacks. In addition, in most real world
cases, the value of k is chosen to be on a level of magnitude lower than n as to allow for many queries. We
show that for these cases, specifically any case where k ≥ 4 and n ≥ 2k, the vehicle whose speed is never
returned by any query can be chosen as any vehicle by the adversary.
Lemma 2.2. Let V be a set of n vehicles v1, v2, . . . , vn positioned along a linear graph at coordinates
x1, x2, . . . , xn at time τ . If k ≥ 4, for any value n ≥ 2k there exists a corresponding assignment of speeds
s1, s2, . . . , sn, such that there exists a node vj with speed sj which cannot be determined by any attacker
with access to the Fmin, Fmax and Fmed queries over the graph.
Proof. We prove by induction for k = 4 and n ≥ 2k, then extrapolate for k ≥ 4 and n ≥ 2k.
Show Correctness for k = 4, n = 8
With vehicles v1, v2, v3, . . . , v8 positioned at x1, x2, x3, . . . , x8, set the values of s1, s2, s3, . . . , s8 such
that s8 > s4 > s3 > s7 > s6 > s1 > s2 > s5. The value of s3 cannot be determined by an attacker even
by running all possible query combinations on the graph. The results of all such possible queries can be see
in Table 1.
Table 1: All Possible Results of Fmin, Fmax and Fmid with k = 4 and n = 8.
Range Containing 4 Vehicles
[x1, x4] [x2, x5] [x3, x6] [x4, x7] [x5, x8]
Fmin s2 s5 s5 s5 s5
Fmax s4 s4 s4 s4 s8
Fmed s1 s2 s6 s6 s6
Range Containing 5 Vehicles
[x1, x5] [x2, x6] [x3, x7] [x4, x8]
Fmin s5 s5 s5 s5
Fmax s4 s4 s4 s8
Fmed s1 s6 s7 s7
Range Containing 6 Vehicles
[x1, x6] [x2, x7] [x3, x8]
Fmin s5 s5 s5
Fmax s4 s4 s8
Fmed s1 s6 s7
Range Containing 7 Vehicles
[x1, x7] [x2, x8]
Fmin s5 s5
Fmax s4 s8
Fmed s6 s7
Range Containing 8 Vehicles
[x1, x8]
Fmin s5
Fmax s8
Fmed s6
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Assume Correctness for k = 4, n = (N | N ≥ 2k)
Given a set of vehicles v1, v2, v3, . . . , vN positioned at coordinates x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN , assume there exists
an assignment of corresponding speeds s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN such that there exists some value sj belonging to
some vehicle vj at position xj , which cannot be determined by an attacker with access to any number of
Fmin, Fmax, Fmed queries under a k = 4 limitation.
Prove for k = 4, n = (N + 1 | N ≥ 2k)
We assign s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN such that for the subgraph [x1, xN ], for k = 4, there exists some value of sj
which is never revealed by any query Fmin, Fmax, Fmed. Assume sj ∈ (s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN−3). We note 2
properties regarding sN+1 of the node vN+1, placed at (xN+1 | xN+1 > xN ):
1. Regardless of the value of sN+1: ∀xi | xi ∈ [x1, xj ]⇒ Fmin([xi, xN+1]) < sj . (i.e. sj cannot be the
result of any Fmin query in the range [x1, xN+1])
2. regardless of the value of sN+1 : ∀xi | xi ∈ [x1, xj ]⇒ Fmax([xi, xN+1]) > sj . (i.e. sj cannot be the
result of any Fmax query in the range [x1, xN+1])
Therefore, we must only assign sN+1 such that it does not cause sj to be the result of any Fmed query.
Define smedi to be the result of Fmed([xi, xN ]). Due to the properties of Fmed, if med1 > sj then ∀i | 1 ≤
i ≤ j ⇒ medi > sj . Conversely, if med1 < sj then ∀i | 1 ≤ i ≤ j ⇒ medi < sj . Otherwise at least
one of those queries would have returned sj as a result, which contradicts the induction assumption. Define
s′med to be the closest median value to sj from the previously stated queries.
s′med = Fmed([xy, xN ]) | ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ⇒ |sj − smedi | ≥ |sj − sy|
We set sN+1 to be some uniformly distributed random value between s′med and sj . We now look at
Fmed([xi, xN+1]) and note that for any value i | 1 ≤ i ≤ j, the results ofFmed([xi, xN ]) andFmed([xi, xN+1])
are either the same value or adjacent values, as the speeds in the range differ by exactly 1 value. Since no
value smedi is adjacent to sj , then sj cannot be the result of any value Fmed([xi, xN+1], 1 ≤ i ≤ j). There
exist no other queries of the type fmed which contain both xj and xN+1, therefore we now have an assign-
ment s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN , sN+1 such that the value sj cannot be discovered by an attacker.
The above holds for the assumption sj ∈ (s1, s2, s3, . . . , sN−3). It is easy to see that due to symmetry, the
case where sj ∈ (s4, s5, s6, . . . , sN ) allows us to shift all values of S one vehicle to the right, and assign the
random value between s′med and sj to s1. This completes correctness for all positions of vj .
Extrapolate for k ≥ 4, n ≥ 2k
Similar to 2.1, increasing k for a given value of n only reduces the amount of information available to the
attacker. Therefore, if a value sj exists for an assignment in a graph with n vehicles under the k = 4
limitation (with n ≥ 2k), it will exist for any value of k such that 4 ≤ k ≤ n2 .
3 Collaborative Filtering
Collaborative filtering (CF) is a technique commonly used to build personalized recommendations on the
Web. In collaborative filtering, algorithms are used to make automatic predictions about a user’s interests
by compiling preferences from several users. In order to provide personalized information to a user, the
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CF system needs to be provided with sufficient information regarding his or her preferences, behavioral
characteristics, as well as demographic information of the individual. The accuracy of the recommendations
is dependent largely on how much of this information is known to the CF system. However, this informa-
tion can prove to be extremely dangerous if it falls in the wrong hands. Several methods aimed at hiding
and anonymizing user data have been proposed and studied in an attempt to reduce the privacy issues of
collaborative filtering. Among these methods is the data obfuscation technique “Nearest Neighbor Data
Substitution” (NeNDS) proposed by Parameswaran and Blough in [2]. Using this approach, items in each
column of the database are clustered into groups by closeness of their values, and a substitution algorithm is
applied to each group. The algorithm gives each item a new location within the group such that each item
now corresponds to a new row in the original database. The relative closeness in values of the substituted
items allows for the recommendation system to maintain a good degree of approximation when the CF algo-
rithm is applied to obtain recommendations, while the substitution itself offers a level of privacy by hiding
the original values associated with each individual user. In this section, we show the possibility of a privacy
attack on the substituted database by an attacker with partial knowledge of the original data.
3.1 The NeNDS Algorithm
The Nearest Neighbor Data Substitution (NeNDS) technique is a lossless data obfuscation technique that
preserves the privacy of individual data elements by substituting them with one of their Euclidean space
neighbors. NeNDS uses a permutation-based approach in which groups of similar items undergo permuta-
tion. The permutation approach hides the original value of a data item by substituting it with another data
item that is similar to it but not the same. NeNDs treats each column in the database as a separate dataset.
The first step in NeNDS is the creation of similar sets of items called neighborhoods. These items contained
in each neighborhood are selected in a manner that maintains Euclidean closeness between neighbors using
some distance measuring function suited to the data. Each data set is divided into a pre-specified number of
neighborhoods. The items in each neighborhood are then permuted in such a way that each item is displaced
from its original position, no two items undergo swapping, and the difference between the values of the
original and the obfuscated items is minimal. The number of neighbors in each neighborhood is denoted
NHsize, with 3 ≤ NHsize ≤ N where N is the number of items in the dataset (this is due to the fact that
NHsize = 1 does not allow any permutation and NHsize = 2 is the trivial case of swapping between 2
items and easily reversible).
The substitution process is performed by determining the optimal permutation set subject to the following
conditions:
• No two elements in the neighborhood undergo swapping.
• The elements are displaced from their original position.
• Substitution is not performed between duplicate elements.
The permutation mapping is done by creating a tree depicting all possible permutation paths and selecting
the path with the minimal maximum distance between any 2 substitutions. For example, we look at the case
of the neighborhood [75, 77, 82, 70]. The optimal path for substitution would be 70→ 77→ 82→ 75→ 70
with the new neighborhood order being [82, 70, 77, 75] and the maximal difference between any 2 substituted
items being (70→ 77 and 82→ 75). Once the substitutions in each neighborhood is complete, the column
of the original database is replaced with column containing the new item positions. The detailed algorithm
can be found in [2]. Note that this algorithm is deterministic for any given value of NHsize, and will yield
the same permutations given any original order of the original dataset.
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3.2 Privacy Attack on NeNDS
In this section we will show an attack on a NeNDS permutated database by an attacker with partial knowl-
edge of the original database, specifically the attacker knows the original position of at least NHsize − 2
items in each neighborhood. The attack is performed under the following assumptions:
• The attacker has complete knowledge of the NeNDS algorithm.
• The attacker knows the neighborhood size, NHsize used by the algorithm.
• The attacker can measure the Euclidean distance between the items in the database.
• The attacker has access to the output permutated database (i.e. the new positions of all items).
We will show the attack for a single dataset (column), however since the algorithm is performed indepen-
dently for each dataset, this can be extended to the entire database. For a given dataset of size n, we define
the following notations:
• Let X be the original dataset [x1, x2, . . . , xn].
• Let Y be the NeNDS obfuscated dataset [y1, y2, . . . , yn].
• Let Xp be the original data items in the pth neighborhood, [xp1, xp2, . . . , xpn].
• Let Yp be the obfuscated data items in the pth neighborhood, [yp1, yp2, . . . , ypn].
• Let up1, up2 be the 2 items in Xp whose original position is unknown to the attacker.
The attack is successful if the attacker can determine the original position in X of up1 and up2 for all values
of p, 1 ≤ p ≤ nNHsize .
3.2.1 The Case of NHsize = 3
We look at the simple case of the minimal neighborhood size, NHsize = 3. In this case, we have for each
value of p the neighborhood [xp1, xp2, xp3]. The attacker can only know the location of 1 of these items.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the attacker knows the position of xp1, and as such the original
dataset to be [xp1, up1, up2] where both up1 and up2 could be the original positions of xp2 and xp3. We
now look at the output neighborhood after the NeNDS algorithm. Due to the restrictions of the NeNDS
algorithm which require each item to be relocated and do not allow swapping between 2 items, the resulting
neighborhood Yp can only be one of the following permutations:
1. [yp1, yp2, yp3] = [xp2, xp3, xp1].
2. [yp1, yp2, yp3] = [xp3, xp1, xp2].
Any other permutation would entail leaving an item in its original position. Assume permutation (1). The
attacker can determine that the value yp1 could not have originally been in position up2 since this is the
current position of xp1 and the algorithm does not allow swapping between 2 items. Therefore, up2 = xp3
and up1 = xp2. Assume permutation (2). The attacker can determine that the value yp1 could not have
originally been in position up1 for the same reason, and reaches the same conclusion - the original order for
the neighborhood p is [xp1, xp2, xp3].
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3.2.2 The General Case of any NHsize
In this section we will show that the knowledge of NHsize − 2 original value positions is enough for an
attacker to learn the original positions of all NHsize values in a neighborhood. We define Lo(x) and Ln(x)
for any value x ∈ X to be the original and new location (row) of that value respectively. Taking some
neighborhood Xp in X , the attacker knows the position Lo(xpi) for NHsize− 2 values in Xp. For 2 values,
up1, up2, positions Lo(up1), Lo(up2) remain unknown. After obfuscation, all new positions Ln(ypi) are
known to the attacker. With this knowledge, since the values in the neighborhood Xp are chosen by their
Euclidean closeness, the attacker learns the 2 values [up1, up2] and their new positions [Ln(up1), Ln(up2)].
There remain 2 possible original positions Lo(up1), Lo(up2) between which the attacker cannot distinguish
(i.e. each one of the values could have been at each one of the possible positions originally).
We now examine the new values in Lo(up1), Lo(up2). There are 2 cases: either 1 of the values is up1 or
up2, or both values are from the other values in Xp whose original position is known to the attacker. Note
that the case Lo(up1) = Ln(up2), Lo(up2) = Ln(up1) cannot exist since by definition of the algorithm, no
2 items undergo swapping. We now show the attack for both cases, resulting in the discovery of the original
positions for up1, up2.
Case 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that up1 resides in a position whose original value is unknown, meaning
was either up1 or up2. It is easy to see that Ln(up1) = Lo(up2) since no item remains in the same position
after obfuscation. In addition, the remaining unknown position is Lo(up1). The attacker now knows the
original position of both previously unknown values.
Case 2
In this case, both Lo(up1) and Lo(up2) now contain values whose original position were known to the at-
tacker. We arbitrarily define those positions to be L1 and L2 and their original values u1 and u2 respectively.
The attacker can know use the following method to backtrack the obfuscation path and find the original
positions of up1 and up2. We look at the value currently in L1 and denote this value yp1. This was the item
in the obfuscation path immediately before u1. Lo(yp1) is known to the attacker and contains the value that
was in the obfuscation path before yp1. Denote this value yp2. We now continue this backtracking of the
path by examining the value in Lo(yp2) and so on until we reach on of the values up1, up2. Since the path is
created using a tree structure which contains no cycles, the first unknown value we will find must correspond
to u2 (as u1 will be that last item found in our backtracking and complete the path). Assume, without loss
of generality, that u2 = up1. The attacker now knows that L2 = Lo(up1) and vice versa.
3.3 NeNDS Shortcomings
In addition to being susceptible to partial knowledge reconstruction, the NeNDS algorithm has an exponen-
tial runtime which is not suitable for real world applications. It can be shown the NeNDS algorithm solves
the Bottleneck Traveling Salesman problem (BTSP), which is known to be NP-Complete in the general case.
For some cases of a defined distance function between values in the database, such as in the case of one di-
mensional Euclidean distance, there exists a polynomial time solution producing the same results as the
NeNDS algorithm (see Figure 2 and Table 2). In the general case, there are approximation algorithms for
BTSP, such as given by Kao and Sanghi [14] that can be adapted for the case of NeNDS-like perturbation,
giving the same level of privacy while achieving an approximate level of accuracy.
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Figure 2: Comparison of NeNDS original algorithm to bottleneck TSP for linear networks. (a) NeNDS tree
algorithm - exponential runtime. (b) Bottleneck TSP on linear graph - linear runtime.
Table 2: NeNDS transformation result table - same for both algorithms.
Row Original Value Transformed Value
1 86 93
2 88 85
3 93 94
4 85 86
5 94 88
4 Conclusions
With more and more user data being stored by companies and organizations, and a growing demand to dis-
seminate and share this data, the risks to security and privacy rise greatly. While some of these issues have
been addressed with encryption and authorization protocols, the potential for misuse of access still exists.
The need for protecting user privacy while still maintaining utility of databases has given birth to a wide
variety of data anonymization techniques. In this research we have analyzed the behavior, vulnerabilities
and shortcomings of instances of the data perturbation and the query-set-size control methods. For query-
set-size control over a vehicular network (graph based dataset) we have shown the aggregate average query
function to be vulnerable to private data leakage. On the other hand, the amalgamation of the minimum,
maximum and median query functions allow for user privacy under the examined model. For the case of
data perturbation we have presented a partial knowledge attack on the NeNDS algorithm. In addition, we
prove the exponential runtime of this algorithm and offer an alternative for the linear coordinate case.
We plan on continued exploration of the privacy attacks described in Section 2. We look to find an upper
limit on the number of allowed queries that will reduce the possibility of leaking private information. Other
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directions in this area include analyzing this query behavior with regards to different data structures, data
types and query types. With regards to the attack described in Section 3.2, we intend to look for possi-
bilities of adding randomness to the base permutation of the original data, in order to improve the privacy
afforded by NeNDS. This may entail selecting different random values for each NHsize and using a non-
deterministic, non-optimal permutation algorithm for column transformation, and could come at the cost of
a minor loss of data accuracy.
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